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Business Associations
by Edward P. Bonapfel*
and E. Bowen Reichert ShoemakerI. INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys notable cases in the areas of corporate, limited-liability
company (LLC), partnership, agency, and joint-venture law decided between
June 1, 2016 and May 31, 2017 by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia
Court of Appeals, and the United States district courts in Georgia.'
II. ISSUES OF FIRST IMPRESSION

In S.D.E., Inc. v. Finley,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
McDonald's shift manager could properly be served with a complaint
against the franchisee's corporation. 3 The plaintiff slipped at one of the
corporation's restaurants and sued the corporation, serving the shift
manager at the restaurant via the local sheriffs office. The shift manager
accepted service and put the papers to the side, apparently never
notifying the franchisee corporation that it had been served. The
franchisee corporation did not answer, and the trial court entered a

*Legal Counsel for Aaron's, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson College (B.A., 2002);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2009). Member, Mercer Law Review
(2007-2009); Lead Articles Editor (2008-2009). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Senior Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., magna cum laude, 2006); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 2011). Member, Mercer Law Review (2009-2011); Editor in Chief (2010-2011).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of business associations law during the prior survey period, see
Edward P. Bonapfel & E. Bowen Reichert Shoemaker, Business Associations, Annual
Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 68 MERCER L. REV. 71 (2016).
2. 340 Ga. App. 684, 798 S.E.2d 303 (2017).
3. Id. at 688, 798 S.E.2d at 307. The defendant is a Georgia corporation that owns
four Georgia McDonald's restaurants. Id. at 684, 798 S.E.2d at 305.
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$250,000 default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 4 The franchisee
corporation appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.5
Section 9-11-4(e)(1) 6 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) permits service upon a Georgia corporation "by delivering a
copy of the summons attached to a copy of the complaint .

.

. to the

president or other officer of such corporation or foreign corporation, a
managing agent thereof, or a registered agent thereof."7 A managing
agent is further defined as "a person employed by a corporation or a
foreign corporation who is at an office or facility in this state and who has
managerial or supervisory authority for" the corporation. 8
The Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed the facts developed during
discovery and concluded that the shift manager qualified as someone
with "managerial or supervisory authority," and thus, service was
proper.9 Specifically, the court relied on the facts that the shift manager:
(1) handled customer complaints; (2) was responsible for the "quality of
the food, service, cleanliness and safety of the premises"; (3) tracked
inventory and waste; and (4) made bank deposits. 10 The court also relied
on the fact that another shift manager accepted service and successfully
gave the documents to a supervisor." The court seemed particularly
persuaded by the last fact, writing that "given that another shift manager
had also been served and had successfully transmitted the summons and
complaint to a corporate officer, there was also evidence that it was
anticipated that someone in that position would be served as an agent of
the corporate principal." 2 In light of Finley, companies doing business in
Georgia should ensure proper procedures are in place for the receipt of
legal service and other notices.
III. NOTEWORTHY CASES

A. Liability for Successor Companies
In Sager v. Ivy Falls Plantation Homeowners' Ass'n,13 a homeowner
sued a homeowners' association seeking a declaratory judgment that the

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 684, 798 S.E.2d at 304-05.
Id. at 684, 798 S.E.2d at 305.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1)(A) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1)(B) (2017).
S.D.E., Inc., 340 Ga. App. at 686, 798 S.E.2d at 306.
Id. at 687, 798 S.E.2d at 307.
Id. at 687-88, 798 S.E.2d at 307.
Id. at 688, 798 S.E.2d at 307.
339 Ga. App. 111, 793 S.E.2d 455 (2016).
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homeowners' association could not collect association dues from her. 1 4
After building a subdivision, the developer incorporated a homeowners'
association and recorded covenants for each lot owner. The homeowners'
association was dissolved in July 2005. In October 2006, two residents
incorporated a new homeowners' association under the same name. The
plaintiff purchased property in the subdivision in 2010 and, in 2014, the
new homeowners' association attempted to collect dues. The plaintiff
sued, and following a hearing, the trial court held that the new
homeowners' association was a successor-in-interest to the old
homeowners' association based on the "continuity of interest" test. 15
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. 16 The court reviewed the case
law behind the continuity of interest test and noted that in most
instances the successor assumed the original obligations of the
predecessor and usually involved a vote of the membership. 17However,
in Sager, "there ha[d] been no transfer of any assets, no vote to
incorporate the New Association, nor any other act taken by a majority
of purported members with respect to the New Association." 18 Further,
"the record contain[ed] no evidence that the New Association took any
action to complete the organization process, elect new board members or
officers, or adopt new bylaws regarding governance and dues collection
authority."1 9

B. Limited-Liability Companies and ManagingMember Liability to
Limited-Liability Company Members
In PracticeBenefits, LLC v. Entera Holdings, LLC,20 Practice Benefits
was a member of Entera. After Entera took actions to the alleged
detriment of Practice Benefits, including a distribution to all other
members of the LLC, Practice Benefits sued Entera and its managing
member alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The
trial court granted both defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the

14. Id. at 111, 793 S.E.2d at 455.
15. Id. at 111-12, 793 S.E.2d at 455-56.
16. Id. at 111, 793 S.E.2d at 455.
17. Id. at 113-16, 793 S.E.2d at 457-58. For a further discussion of one of these cases,
Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. Fairlawnon Jones CondominiumAss'n, 334 Ga. App. 595, 780 S.E.2d
35 (2015), where the new association was held to be a "mere continuation" of the old one
see Bonapfel & Shoemaker, supra note 1, at 74-75.
18. Sager, 339 Ga. App. at 116, 793 S.E.2d at 458.
19. Id.
20. 340 Ga. App. 378, 797 S.E.2d 250 (2017).
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claims against the managing member were derivative in nature and that
Entera was not a party to the operating agreement. 21
With respect to Entera, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment in Entera's favor and held that LLCs are bound by the terms
of their operating agreements. 22 Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 14-11-101(18)23
states that an LLC "is bound by its operating agreement whether or not
the limited liability company executes the operating agreement." 24 The
court of appeals also rejected the managing member's argument that the
breach of fiduciary claim against him was derivative in nature. 25 The
court acknowledged the general rule that breach of fiduciary duty claims
should be brought in derivative suits against the company. 26 However,
an exception exists if a plaintiff alleges a "special injury" that is unique
to the shareholder. 27 An allegation of a violation of the operating
agreement's requirement of a pro rata distribution was a sufficient
special injury to survive a motion to dismiss argument that the claim was
derivative in nature. 28
C. Rights and Interests of Limited-Liability Company Members
In Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC v. RMW Development Fund II,

LLC, 2 9 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a member of an LLC could

not obtain injunctive relief against the LLC to prevent it from making
improvements to real property owned by the LLC. Veterans Parkway and
RMW formed an LLC to own an apartment complex in Columbus.
Veterans Parkway owned 25% of the LLC and was the managing
member, while RMW held a 75% interest. Veterans Parkway proposed
building a second entrance to the apartment complex, to which RMW
objected and filed suit-eventually moving the trial court for an
interlocutory injunction to stop the project. The trial court granted the
injunction and RMW appealed. 30

21. Id. at 378-79, 797 S.E.2d at 251-52.
22. Id. at 380, 797 S.E.2d at 253.
23. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-101(18) (2017).
24. Practice Benefits, 340 Ga. App. at 379, 797 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting O.C.G.A. §
14-11-101(18) (2017)).
25. Id. at 380-81, 797 S.E.2d at 253-54.
26. Id. at 380, 797 S.E.2d at 253.
27. Id. (quoting Grace Bros. v. Farley Indus., 264 Ga. 817, 819, 450 S.E.2d 814, 816
(1994)).
28. Id. at 381, 797 S.E.2d at 254.
29. 300 Ga. 99, 793 S.E.2d 398 (2016).
30. Id. at 99-100, 793 S.E.2d at 399.
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The Georgia Supreme Court recognized the general principle that real
property can be sufficiently unique to support equitable remedies,
including injunctions. 31 But a member's interest in an LLC "is itself only
a personal property interest; a member's stake in a[n] LLC is not an
interest in real property or an interest in any specific property of the
LLC."3 2 Thus, without an interest in the land, RMW could not seek
injunctive relief "based upon a claim that the land was threatened with
harm." 33 The court also noted that RMW had an adequate remedy at law
such that injunctive relief was inappropriate. 34 Accordingly, the supreme
court reversed the injunction. 35
In Perry Golf Course Development, LLC v. Columbia Residential,
LLC,36 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an
arbitration clause was still binding where a previously-binding operating
agreement had been deemed unenforceable. 37 The court held that the
arbitration clause was enforceable, regardless of whether the LLC's
members had abandoned the operating agreement. 38 The court noted
that the arbitration clause in this particular case was broadly worded
and its application to the facts of this case seemed consistent with the
parties' intent. 39 The holding reinforces Georgia courts' authority to
interpret arbitration clauses broadly enough to encompass an entire
business relationship between LLC members.
D. Reverse Veil-Piercing Still Disallowed in Georgia
In CorrugatedReplacements, Inc. v. Johnson,40 the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the rule disallowing reverse veil-piercing in Georgia. 41
The plaintiffs were a family involved in a car accident that occurred when
a young, intoxicated driver collided with the van carrying the Johnson
family, killing one Johnson child and injuring other family members. The
plaintiffs sued the company where the driver's father worked and argued
for the application of "outsider" reverse veil-piercing. Under this theory,
the plaintiffs alleged that they, as outsiders of the company where the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 103, 793 S.E.2d at 401.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 103-04, 793 S.E.2d at 401.
Id. at 104, 793 S.E.2d at 402.
337 Ga. App. 525, 786 S.E.2d 565 (2016).
Id. at 525-26, 786 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 530, 786 S.E.2d at 569.
Id. at 530-31, 786 S.E.2d at 569.
340 Ga. App. 364, 797 S.E.2d 238 (2017).
Id. at 369-71, 797 S.E.2d at 243-44.
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driver's father worked, could pierce the corporate veil to satisfy the debts
of a corporate insider based on the company's assets. 42
The court of appeals rejected the theory of reverse veil-piercing and
noted that the plaintiffs misread precedential cases and failed to
acknowledge the general rejection of the reverse veil-piercing theory that
prevails in Georgia jurisprudence. 43 The court of appeals noted that the
Georgia Supreme Court had only allowed reverse veil-piercing in "very
limited circumstances" when transition remedies, like agency principles
and standard judgment collection procedures, were inadequate. 44 Where
traditional remedies existed, a new theory of liability-like reverse veilpiercing-was unnecessary. Thus, the court prohibited any exception to
the rule that reverse piercing is not a viable claim in Georgia. 45
E. JurisdictionOver CorporateEntities
In Techjet Innovations Corp. v. Benjelloun,46 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia found that the Georgia longarm statute 47 authorized personal jurisdiction over a non-Georgia-based
defendant. 48 The court determined that, despite his lack of a physical
presence in Georgia, the defendant "had a substantial role in the
circumstances that led to th[e] lawsuit," and that he "was a primary
participant in the business relationship that gave rise to th[e] suit, and
the breach of contract at issue in particular." 49 The court noted that the
exercise of jurisdiction was based solely on the plaintiffs allegations in
the complaint and that it was the responsibility of the plaintiff to prove
the jurisdictional facts at trial.50 If the facts show the defendant had less
of a role in the contracts and communications with the plaintiff than
what was alleged, then dismissal could be appropriate at that point in
time. 51

42. Id. at 364-66, 368-69, 797 S.E.2d at 240, 242-43.
43. Id. at 368-71, 797 S.E.2d at 243-44.
44. Id. at 369, 797 S.E.2d at 243.
45. Id. at 370-71, 797 S.E.2d at 243-44.
46. 203 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (2016).
47. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (2017).
48. Techjet, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 1221-22.
49. Id. at 1228. In so holding, the court affirmed the articulation of the long-arm statute
used in Amerireach.com LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 719 S.E.2d 489 (2011), which held
that personal jurisdiction is appropriate where a defendant is a 'primary participant in an
alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a resident' of Georgia, even if his participation
was in his 'corporate capacity."' Techjet, 203 F.Supp. 3d at 1224 (quoting Walker, 290 Ga.
at 267, 719 S.E.2d at 494).
50. Techjet, 203 F. Supp. 3d. at 1229.
51. Id.
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In PandoraFranchising,LLC v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP,52 the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Court of Appeals
determination that venue was properly established in the county where
a tort was alleged to have occurred in a case against a foreign LLC.53 The
plaintiff, Kingdom Retail Group, sued Pandora in Thomas County
"alleging Pandora wrongfully withheld its consent to Kingdom's bid to
acquire a number of Pandora franchises." 54 Pandora, a foreign LLC,
sought removal to Gwinnett County because that is the location of its
principal place of business in Georgia. The trial court granted Pandora's
request, which was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals.55
In upholding the intermediate court's ruling, the Georgia Supreme
Court reviewed O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b),56 which provides that tort actions
against domestic and foreign corporations are subject to venue in the
county where the cause of action originated.57 The statute further
provides for removal of tort actions against corporations as follows: "If
venue is based solely on this paragraph, the defendant shall have the
right to remove the action to the county in Georgia where the defendant
maintains its principal place of business."5 8 The court placed particular
importance on the phrase "in Georgia," comparing the statute to various
other venue statutes that employ the term "principal place of business,"
all of which use the phrase "principal place of business in this state."59
The court reasoned that "the legislature knew how to make clear its
intent to confer venue at the place where a business entity maintained
its principal place of business in this state, whether or not it was its
worldwide principal place of business."60 Consequently, if venue is based
on subsection (b), the statute only permits removal of actions "to the
county in Georgia where the defendant maintains its worldwide principal
place of business. If that place is not located in a Georgia county, then no
right to remove is granted."6 1 It remains to be seen how the "worldwide
principal place of business" concept will apply to multinational
companies with United States subsidiaries head-quartered in Georgia,
such as Mercedes-Benz USA and InterContinental Hotels Group.
52. 299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016).
53. Id. at 723-24, 791 S.E.2d at 787-88. For a discussion of the Georgia Court of
Appeals ruling, see Bonapfel & Shoemaker, supranote 1, at 80.
54. PandoraFranchising,LLC., 299 Ga. at 724, 791 S.E.2d at 787.
55. Pandora,229 Ga. at 723-24, 791 S.E.2d at 787.
56. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b) (2017).
57. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(3) (2017).
58. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) (2017).
59. Pandora, 229 Ga. at 725-26, 791 S.E.2d at 788-89.
60. Id. at 726, 791 S.E.2d at 789.
61. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b); Pandora, 299 Ga. at 727, 791 S.E.2d at 789.
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F. Guaranteesby the CorporationDo Not Obligate Its Signatories
In Lynchar, Inc. v. Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. ,62 Colonial sued
Lynchar and two of its shareholders for amounts owed on an open
account. Colonial argued that the shareholders personally guaranteed
Lynchar's debts and were therefore liable. The trial court granted
Colonial's motion for partial summary judgment on the shareholders'
liability.63
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.6 4 The shareholders of Lynchar
executed personal guarantees on behalf of T&W Oil, Inc., as a "doing
business as" of Lynchar. 65 Colonial's account listed "Lynchar Inc. d/b/a
T&W Oil Co." as the billing name and one shareholder signed his emails
as "President of T&W Oil Company."6 6 Nevertheless, the court refused to
enforce the guarantee against the shareholders.6 7 The language of the
contract was unambiguous and therefore "judicial construction of the
contract of guaranty is improper, and parol evidence is inadmissible to
cure the defect." 68 The court strictly construed the guarantees and held
that the shareholders were not obligated to guarantee Lynchar's debts. 69
Lynchar confirms that drafters should use care to ensure that the proper
legal entity to be obligated is clearly identified in the parties' contract.
IV. CONCLUSION

As this Article demonstrates, Georgia courts are challenged with
deciding progressively more complex issues in corporate, LLC,
partnership, agency, and joint-venture law as the business community
continues to expand. There are many questions raised by the cases
decided during this survey period and practitioners should be prepared
to confront these and many more in the coming years.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

341 Ga. App. 489, 801 S.E.2d 576 (2017).
Id. at 489, 801 S.E.2d at 577.
Id.
Id. at 491, 801 S.E.2d at 579.
Id. at 489, 491, 801 S.E.2d at 577-78.
Id. at 495, 801 S.E.2d at 581.
Id. at 494-95, 801 S.E.2d at 581.
Id. at 495, 801 S.E.2d at 581.

